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STATE EX REL. J.P.F.
(decided April 2, 2004)
JANIE BYALIK*
Imagine an inexperienced young boy who, on the verge of dis-
covering his sexuality, inappropriately touches a girl.  What is the
worst thing that can happen?  He can become branded a criminal
for life.  In New Jersey, an offense of fourth degree sexual contact
carries with it lifetime compulsory registration as a sex offender if
the victim is a minor.1  Under New Jersey’s “Megan’s Law” statute,2
the teenager’s inappropriate fumblings can mark him as a sexual
predator and subject him to stigma, prejudice, and denied opportu-
nities for the rest of his life.3
Megan’s Law was enacted to prevent heinous tragedies such as
what happened to Megan Kanka.4  The statute requires registration
of both adults and juveniles adjudicated delinquent for sexual con-
tact, a fourth degree offense.5  Registration for minor offenses is
obligatory not based on the immoral nature of the conduct, but
* J.D. candidate 2006, New York Law School.
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7- 2b (2) (West 2005).
2. New Jersey Governor Christine Whitman signed “Megan’s Law” on October
31, 1994. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C–7–1 through §2C: 7– 17 (West 2005).
3. See Timothy E. Wind, The Quandary of Megan’s Law: When The Child Sex Offender
Is a Child, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 73, 118 (2003)  (discussing the goals and conse-
quences of Megan’s Law and its application to juvenile offenders).
4. In 1994, responding to a desperate mother’s cry for help to find her missing
child, the police recovered Megan Kanka’s body dumped in some weeds at a local park
in Hamilton, N.J.  Jesse Timmendequas, a twice convicted sex offender, who lived across
the street from the Kankas, confessed to killing Megan.  Timmendequas lured Megan
into his home with the promise of seeing a puppy, proceeded to repeatedly rape and
sodomize her, and then finally strangle her by placing two plastic bags over her head.
Megan’s mother contends that had she known of Timmendequas’ history, the tragedy
could have been prevented.  See State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 66 (N.J. 1999); see
also Man Charged in 7 – Year – Old Neighbor’s Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at B5;
Charles Stile, In Memory of Megan, TRENTON TIMES, Oct. 4, 1994, at A1.
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:14-3b (West 2005).  Megan’s Law imposes compulsory
community notification requirements for convicted sex offenders, both adults and
juveniles. See generally Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legis-
lative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001) (discussing Megan’s Law).
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based solely on the age of the victim.6  The stigma attached to mi-
nors forced to register under Megan’s Law psychologically harms
them and impairs their chances of ever securing employment, mak-
ing friends, and having a normal life.7  This lifetime registration
requirement is unwarranted based on a minor offense that, while
inappropriate, was perhaps a mere youthful indiscretion.
In State ex rel. J.P.F.,8 the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division, upheld the application of Megan’s Law registration re-
quirements to a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of fourth degree
sexual contact.9  The court ordered the juvenile to register as a sex
offender and rejected the defendant’s contention that Megan’s Law
should not apply to him.10  The court’s literal reading of the statute
was correct, but the application of Megan’s Law to juveniles
charged with fourth degree crimes is overly broad and runs con-
trary to the purpose of the Juvenile Code.11  This case comment
argues that the legislature should amend the particular portion of
the statute that makes registration compulsory based solely on the
age of the victim or, in the alternative, the courts should allow for
early termination of registration requirements upon a showing that
the juvenile is a candidate for rehabilitation.
In the case at bar, J.P.F. became acquainted with V.K.12 and
wished to establish an intimate relationship with her.13  Several
weeks later, J.P.F. and V.K. gathered together with several friends
for a night out.14  When V.K.’s boyfriend failed to show up with her
car keys, J.P.F. offered to drive her to her car.15  As he drove to her
car, J.P.F. began rubbing V.K.’s legs, ignoring her disapproval of his
6. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7 – 2b (2) (West 2005) (“For the purposes of this act a
sex offense shall include the following: A conviction, adjudication of delinquency, or
acquittal by reason of insanity . . . criminal sexual contact pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:14-3b. if
the victim is a minor.”) (emphasis added).
7. Wind, supra note 3, at 118.
8. State ex rel. J.P.F., 845 A.2d 173 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 182-83.
11. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A: 4A-21 (West 2005).
12. J.P.F. was born on May 3, 1985 and V.K. was born on February 14, 1985.  Thus,
on the date in question, J.P.F. and V.K. were three and a half months and one month
shy of their eighteenth birthdays, respectively.
13. J.P.F., 845 A.2d at 175.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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behavior.16  When he parked the car, J.P.F. revealed that he had
V.K.’s keys, and placed the keys in his crotch area for V.K. to re-
cover.17  She, however, refused and exited the car.18  As V.K. ap-
proached her car, J.P.F. blocked her entrance, exposed his penis to
her and requested that she perform oral sex on him.19  He then
proceeded to move behind her, stroke her chest and buttocks over
her clothing, and put his hand inside her jeans.20 V.K. alleged that
J.P.F. digitally penetrated her, although conflicting testimony raised
doubt over the allegations.21  V.K. reported the incident to the po-
lice the next day.22
The state charged J.P.F. with lewdness, harassment, and sexual
assault.23  At trial, J.P.F. produced several witnesses who attested to
V.K.’s flirtatious behavior, disagreement with her boyfriend on the
night of the incident, and an apparent acceptance of J.P.F.’s ad-
vances.24  J.P.F. admitted to touching V.K., but argued that she wel-
comed his advances, relying upon the defense of consent.25
The Somerset County Family Court found that the state failed
to prove the elements of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt
and adjudicated J.P.F. delinquent on the charge of criminal sexual
contact by force or coercion, a lesser included offense.26  J.P.F. was
placed on probation for a period of one year, directed to seek
counseling, and ordered not to have any further contact with the
victim.27  In addition, the court ordered twenty-two days of deten-
tion.28  The court did not, however, order defendant to register as a




20. J.P.F., 845 A.2d at 176.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-4a. (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4c. (West
2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(1) (West 2005).
24. J.P.F., 845 A.2d at 176.
25. Id.
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14 – 3b (West 2005) (“An actor is guilty of criminal sex-
ual contact if he commits an act of sexual contact with the victim under any of the
circumstances set forth in section 2C:14-2c. (1) through (4) . . . Criminal sexual contact
is a crime of the fourth degree.”).
27. J.P.F., 845 A.2d at 176.
28. Id.
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sex offender as required by section 2C:7-2b(2) of Megan’s Law.29
The court recognized that the literal reading of the statute would
impose on J.P.F. a duty to register, but declined to take the literal
approach, stating that such an expansive reading of the law does
not comport with the legislative intent behind the statute.30  The
court held that where the juvenile offender and the victim were
approximately the same age and near the age of majority, the provi-
sion of Megan’s Law that compels registration based on the age of
the victim is not consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of the
Juvenile Code.31  Furthermore, the court noted the lack of “delinea-
tion” in victims’ ages; namely, that the law treated a victim who is
seventeen years and 364 days old the same as if she were only one
day old.32  Finding such a reading of the statute unintended by the
legislature, the court declined to apply it to the defendant.33
The State of New Jersey appealed the lower court’s decision.
J.P.F. filed a cross appeal, claiming the conviction was against the
weight of the evidence.34  The appellate division affirmed J.P.F.’s
conviction, but reversed as to the State’s appeal and held that J.P.F.
was subject to the registration provision of Megan’s Law.35
On appeal, J.P.F. presented three arguments in opposition to
the registration requirements: (1) the obligation of a juvenile who
was adjudicated delinquent to register should terminate at age eigh-
teen; (2) the “low level nature” of a fourth degree crime, coupled
with the fact that both he and the victim were practically the same
age, does not warrant registration under Megan’s Law; and (3) be-
cause Megan’s Law requires registration for criminal sexual contact
only if the victim is a minor, the statute warrants the construction
that the perpetrator must be an adult or a “significantly older
juvenile.”36
29. Id.
30. Id. at 176–77.
31. Id.
32. J.P.F., 845 A.2d at 177.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 178.
36. Id. at 182–83.
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J.P.F.’s first argument rested on the provision of the Juvenile
Code that requires the state to seal juvenile records37 and terminate
orders of dispositions at age eighteen.38 The court dismissed this
argument by noting that Megan’s Law registration provisions are
not deemed to constitute “order[s] of disposition.”39  Furthermore,
allowing termination of sex offender registration for a juvenile ad-
judicated delinquent past age fourteen would be at odds with the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in In re Registrant J.G.40  In
J.G., a ten-year-old boy pled guilty to a crime that would constitute
second degree sexual assault if he were an adult.41  The N.J. Su-
preme Court in J.G. held that for juveniles who were adjudicated
delinquent for a crime they committed when under the age of four-
teen, their registration requirements will terminate at age eighteen
if the juvenile can convince the court that he no longer poses a
threat to the community.42  The court based its decision on the pre-
sumptive criminal incapacity of a child under fourteen years.43  Re-
lying on the holding of J.G., the appellate division rejected J.P.F.’s
argument that his registration should end on his eighteenth
birthday.44
The court addressed the remainder of J.P.F.’s arguments by in-
terpreting the legislative intent behind Megan’s Law and its rela-
tionship to the disclosure provisions of the Juvenile Code.  The
court acknowledged the discrepancy between the registration re-
quirement of Megan’s Law and the non-disclosure provision of the
Juvenile Code,45  but noted that the purpose of the Juvenile Code’s
37. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A–60 (West 2005) (“Social, medical, psychological,
legal and other records of the court and probation division, and records of law enforce-
ment agencies, pertaining to juveniles charged as a delinquent or found to be part of a
juvenile family crisis, shall be strictly safeguarded from public inspection.”).
38. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A–47 (West 2005) (“Any order of disposition entered
in a case under this act shall terminate when the juvenile who is the subject of the order
attains the age of 18, or three years from the date of the order whichever is later. . .”).
39. J.P.F. at 180 (quoting In re B.G., 674 A.2d 178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996)).
40. Id. at 182 (citing In re Registrant J.G., 777 A.2d 891 (N.J. 2001)).
41. J.G., 777 A.2d at 894.
42. Id. at 912.
43. Id.
44. J.P.F., 845 A.2d at 185.
45. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-60 (West 2005).  The Code provides that “legal and
other records of the court and probation division . . . pertaining to juveniles charged as
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non-disclosure provision is to promote rehabilitation of the juve-
nile, whereas the objective of Megan’s Law is to protect the commu-
nity from repeat sex offenders.46  The court reasoned that since the
Juvenile Code was in existence when Megan’s Law was adopted,
“the more specific law — [Megan’s law] — must be interpreted as
prevailing over the more general one [the Juvenile Code].”47
The court next turned to J.P.F.’s contention that in order for
the statute to apply, the perpetrator must be significantly older than
the victim.  The court found this argument “illogical,” stating that
“where the sexual activity is engaged in by force, it is the force that
constitutes the culpable and predatory nature of the conduct.  It
matters little whether the victim is about the same age, older, or
younger than the perpetrator.”48  In addition, the court held that
because the legislature made criminal sexual contact an offense
only if the victim is a minor, this evinced a legislative intent to pro-
tect child victims even for low level sex offenses.49  Further, the
court pointed to the fact that disclosure of the juveniles’ informa-
tion is limited.  Juveniles are generally excluded from the Internet
registries if they are adjudicated delinquent but do not pose a high
risk of re-offense.50
The appellate division concluded that since J.P.F. was in the
fourteen-to-eighteen year-old age range, he was presumptively capa-
ble of committing a criminal act.  Thus, the court held that subject-
ing him to Megan’s Law registration requirements was not
“absurd.”51  While the court acknowledged the legislature’s author-
ity to amend the statute, it noted that it was not the job of the courts
to draw lines, and these substantive judgments should be left to the
legislature to make.52
The holding of the appellate division was correct under the
existing statute in New Jersey; however, the statute is overly broad
with respect to juveniles who commit minor offenses.  The New
a delinquent . . . shall be strictly safeguarded from public inspection,” allowing some
enumerated exceptions.
46. J.P.F., 845 A.2d at 180.
47. Id. at 182 (quoting In re B.G., 674 A.2d 178).
48. Id. at 183.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 184.
51. Id. at 186.
52. Id.
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Jersey legislature should modify Megan’s Law to better correspond
with the rehabilitative purposes of the Juvenile Code.  The legisla-
ture may amend the statute in the following three ways: (1) impose
a restriction similar to the Federal Jacob Wetterling Act; (2) compel
registration, but terminate it when the juvenile attains the age of
eighteen, or three years after the date of the order if the juvenile
proves by clear and convincing evidence that he is no longer a
threat to the community; or (3) abolish the registration require-
ment for fourth degree offenses altogether.
In 1994, Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Pro-
gram53 that established guidelines for state programs to require sex
offender registration.54  The Act set a “minimum baseline” of statu-
tory requirements that states must follow to receive federal fund-
ing.55  The statute addresses an important distinction between acts
that trigger registration by adults and acts that trigger registration
by juveniles.  Section 3(A) of the Jacob Wetterling Act provides, in
pertinent part, that “conduct which is criminal only because of the
age of the victim shall not be considered a criminal offense if the
perpetrator is 18 years of age or younger.”56  Thus, where a victim’s age is
the basis for an offense, Congress apparently intended to provide
harsher penalties for sexual misconduct against minors by perpetra-
tors who are adults, not juveniles.  While the Act only operates to
set the floor for states, Congress seemingly decided that a higher
floor was too strict.  Several state legislatures, evincing a similar in-
tent, have adopted laws that exclude juvenile sex offenders under
the age of eighteen from registering if their offenses were only
criminal based on the age of their victim.57
53. 43 U.S.C.S. §14071 (a)(1)(A) (1994).
54. See generally Jacob Wetterling Foundation, History of the Jacob Wetterling Act, at
http://www.jwf.org/jwf_jwact_history.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2004) (providing an
overview of the Jacob Wetterling Act and discussing its effect on state funding).
55. Wayne A. Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender Classification Practice
and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 599 (2000) (describing the Jacob Wetterling
Act as the “floor” for state programs to follow).
56. 43 U.S.C.S. §14071 (3)(A) (emphasis added).
57. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(4)(C) (2004) (“conduct which is criminal
only because of the age of the victim shall not be considered a criminal offense if the
perpetrator is 18 years of age or younger”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.500(2)(b) (Mich.
2004) (excluding criminal offenses against minors if the offender was under eighteen at
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The New Jersey legislature should follow the direction of Con-
gress and other states and amend its current statute with a provision
similar to section 3(A) of the Jacob Wetterling Act.  Under the pre-
sent statutory requirements, a juvenile adjudicated delinquent
solely because his victim is a minor is subject to a lifetime of com-
pulsory registration.58  Lifetime registration requirement runs afoul
to the long standing notion that juveniles are apt to respond to
treatment and, thus, can be rehabilitated.59  Extending registration
requirements to juveniles for acts that are designated as criminal
solely based on the victim’s age does not advance the goal of reha-
bilitation.  Nevertheless, applying this requirement to adults or to
juveniles who are significantly older than their victim comports with
the traditional approach that adults are held more accountable for
their actions than are juveniles.
New Jersey sexual assault statutes delineate criminal culpability
in degrees based on the age of the victim.  The crime of aggravated
sexual assault, a first degree crime, occurs if the victim is under the
age of thirteen.60  An actor is guilty of sexual assault, a second degree
crime, if the victim is thirteen-to-sixteen years old and the actor is at
least four years older.61  In each instance of sexual assault, the stat-
ute focuses on the age discrepancy between the victim and the of-
the time the offense occurred); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 5401 (10)(b) (2004) (making
an exception to the definition of a “sex offender” when “conduct which is criminal only
because of the age of the victim shall not be considered an offense for purposes of the
registry if the perpetrator is under the age of 18”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-1
(Michie 2004) (maintaining that conduct deemed criminal against a minor “excludes
conduct that is criminal only because of the age of the victim . . . if the perpetrator is
eighteen years of age or younger”).
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7–2(f) (West 2005) (“[A] person required to register
under this act may make application to the Superior Court of this State to terminate the
obligation upon proof that the person has not committed an offense within 15 years
following conviction or release from a correctional facility for any term of imprison-
ment imposed, whichever is later, and is not likely to pose a threat to the safety of
others.”).
59. See Brian R. Suffredini, Note, Juvenile Gunslingers: A Place for Punitive Philosophy
in Rehabilitative Juvenile Justice, 35 B.C. L. REV. 885 (1994).
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2a (1) (West 2005) (“An actor is guilty of aggravated
sexual assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any
one of the following circumstances: The victim is less than 13 years old.”).
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c (4) (West 2005) (“An actor is guilty of sexual assault
if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person under any one of the
following circumstances: The victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years old and the actor
is at least four years older than the victim.”).
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fender.  This supports the notion that sex crimes committed by
adults against children under age sixteen should be penalized more
severely than the same actions by juveniles.  The portion of Megan’s
Law that mandates registration for an offense based solely on the
victim’s age should be modified to reflect this legislative policy.
The registration statute could be amended to read “a conviction,
adjudication of delinquency, or acquittal by reason of insanity for
. . . criminal sexual contact pursuant to N.J.S. 2C:14–3b if the victim
is a minor and the offender is: (1) an adult, or (2) at least four years
older than the victim.” Such reformation of New Jersey’s Megan’s
Law statute will help protect juveniles who are guilty of minor of-
fenses from an unwarranted lifetime stigma as a sex-offender.62
A second proposed amendment to the current statute would
require registration, but allow its termination when the juvenile
reaches his eighteenth birthday or, in the alternative, three years
from the date of registration if the juvenile proves by clear and con-
vincing evidence that he is no longer a threat to the community.
This amendment would extend the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
ruling in J.G.63  The J.G. court focused on the distinction between
juveniles over and under the age of fourteen, finding that juveniles
under fourteen presumptively lack the capacity to commit a
crime.64  The court found “implausible and anomalous the notion
that a child ‘sex offender’ such as J.G. [ten years old at the time of
offense] should, pursuant to Megan’s Law, be subject to a lifetime
registration requirement.”65
The J.G. court stopped short of declaring Megan’s Law uncon-
stitutional as it applies to juveniles, but attempted to reconcile its
purposes with the Juvenile Code by drawing a bright line rule at age
fourteen.66  In imposing registration requirements for sex offend-
ers, the New Jersey legislature did not distinguish between juveniles
younger than fourteen years of age and those older.  The current
62. See Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment: Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication
of Sex-Offender Registration and Community Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
163, 195 (2003) (discussing how the application of Megan’s law to juveniles is contrary
to the goals of the juvenile justice system marking children as “sexual predators” and
“subjecting them to stigma, prejudice, and denied opportunities”).
63. J.G., 777 A.2d 891.
64. Id. at 905.
65. Id. at 912.
66. Id.
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statute subjects a juvenile adjudicated delinquent solely because his
victim is a minor, a fourth degree offense, to a lifetime of compul-
sory registration.67  This requirement is not supported by the Juve-
nile Code and contradicts the notion that juveniles respond to
treatment and can be rehabilitated.68  The purpose behind the
adoption of the Juvenile Code is to “prevent children from being
treated as criminals.”69  Lifetime registration requirement for
juveniles eradicates the protection of a minor’s indiscretions from
public scrutiny.70  In reconciling the purpose of Megan’s Law with
the Juvenile Code, the legislature can allow termination of registra-
tion once the juvenile reaches eighteen, or three years after the
court order, as paralleled in the statute for dispositions,71 and place
the burden on the juvenile to show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that he no longer poses a threat to the community.  This
construction will effectuate the purpose of the Juvenile Act to
“[maintain] an adequate program of supervision, care and rehabili-
tation [for the juvenile] . . . promote accountability and protect the
public.”72  It will also aid in fulfilling the goal of Megan’s Law which
is to protect the community from repeat sex offenders.73  The legis-
lative statement to the Code of Juvenile Justice74 provides for “har-
sher penalties for juveniles who commit serious acts or who are
repetitive offenders, while broadening family responsibility and the
use of alternative dispositions for juveniles committing less serious
offenses.”75  The purpose of the legislation was to handle the serious
67. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7 – 2(f) (West 2005).
68. See generally Suffredini, supra note 59 (discussing the rehabilitative nature of
the juvenile system).
69. Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Threat: Diversion in the Jurisprudence of a Cen-
tury of Juvenile Justice, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2479 (2000).
70. See Garfinkle, supra note 62.
71. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:4A-47(a) (West 2005).  Although Megan’s Law registra-
tion requirements were held not to constitute an order of disposition, see State ex rel.
B.G., 674 A.2d 178, the court can use the statute by analogy to create a workable time
frame before terminating registration requirements.
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:4A–21(b) (West 2005).
73. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:7–1(a) (“The danger of recidivism posed by sex of-
fenders . . . require a system of registration that will permit law enforcement officials to
identify and alert the public when necessary for the public safety.”).
74.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-21 (West 2005).
75. J.G., 777 A.2d at 903 (quoting Statement to Assembly Bill No. 641, Senate
Judiciary Comm. 1 (February 8, 1982)) (emphasis added).
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offenders more stringently.76  Loosening the guidelines for fourth
degree offenses would help effectuate the legislature’s intent in
passing Megan’s Law, which was to guard against the threat of re-
cidivism posed by convicted sex offenders who prey on children.77
The courts should retain discretion in deciding whether to ter-
minate a juvenile’s registration and place the burden upon the ju-
venile to show that he does not pose a risk to the community.
Several states have not only adopted this rule, but have expanded it
to allow courts to use their discretion in requiring registration in
the first place,78 or to require the initial registration only where
there is clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile will likely
re-offend.79  Of the twenty-four states that compel juveniles to regis-
ter, many impose burdens less severe than New Jersey.  For exam-
ple, California imposes registration on offenders for only the most
serious offenses such as rape;80 Mississippi mandates registration
only after the juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent twice for a
sex offense;81 and North Carolina terminates registration on the ju-
venile’s eighteenth birthday.82  Accordingly, the legislature can
mandate initial registration and then allot the family court discre-
tion whether to terminate the requirements, allowing some leni-
ency for juveniles who the court determines to be candidates for
rehabilitation.
The third proposed alternative is to exempt fourth degree of-
fenses from registration requirements altogether.  In New Jersey,
aside from disorderly persons offenses, fourth degree crimes are
the least serious crimes, and usually carry a presumption of non-
incarceration for first time offenders.83  In many cases, first time
76. J.G., 777 A.2d at 903.
77. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 7–1 (West 2004).
78. Iowa, Arkansas, and Colorado allow registration to be subject to the juvenile
court’s discretion. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-903 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-3-412.5(8.5) (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.2(4) (2003).
79. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12.4(b)(3) (Michie 2004).
80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 2004).
81. MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-25 (2004).
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.26 (2004).
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 44-1(d) (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 44-1(e) (West
2005).  In New Jersey, only first and second degree crimes carry a presumption of incar-
ceration.  There is a presumption of non-incarceration for third and fourth degree of-
fenses for first time offenders.
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offenders can enroll into a Pretrial Intervention Program (“PTI”)
where the offender is put on a period of probation, after the com-
pletion of which the charges are dismissed.84  The PTI program is
“based on a rehabilitative model that recognizes that there may be
an apparent causal connection between the offense charged and
the rehabilitative needs of a defendant.”85  One of the recognized
benefits of the PTI program is that “if successfully completed, there
is no record of conviction and the defendant avoids the stigma of a
criminal record.”86  Imposing Megan’s Law registration require-
ments to a fourth degree offense that may be eligible for PTI is
illogical.  In its application of PTI to fourth degree offenders, New
Jersey recognizes that the low level nature of the offense is insuffi-
cient to label someone a criminal and place on them the stigma of
having a criminal record.87  Yet for this same fourth degree offense,
where an offender can escape a criminal record by successful com-
pletion of probation, the legislature imposes a lifetime registration
requirement.  This runs contrary to the  rehabilitative purposes be-
hind the probationary sentence for the crime.  After all, how can
the state punish an offense with a one year probationary period and
then compel the person to register with the state for the remainder
of his life?  In imposing alternatives to incarceration such as PTI, it
seems that the legislature did not intend an offender to be branded
a criminal for life.  By eliminating fourth degree crimes from the
Megan’s Law statute, the legislature may be able to remedy this
seeming inconsistency.
The original purpose behind the enactment of Megan’s Law
was to prevent tragic occurrences such as what happened to Megan
Kanka.  Broadening the scope of the statute and imposing registra-
tion for minor offenses is not consistent with this legislative intent.
Compelling registration of juveniles for fourth degree crimes runs
contrary to the rehabilitative model of the Juvenile Code.  The
court in J.G. attempted to reconcile the two provisions by drawing a
bright line rule.  However, it is the job of the legislature, and not
the courts to reconcile such disparities.
84. Id. See New Jersey Judiciary, Pre Trial Intervention Program, available at http://
www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/crpti.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
85. Id. 
86. Id.
87. Id.
